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Abstract 
[Excerpt] The impact of the market failure that has befallen the residential real estate market during the 
past two years is well-known and self-evident, even if the underlying causes and remedies remain in 
controversy. Whether the market failure was caused by “predatory lenders,” whose only interest was in 
“churning product” to generate fees; “speculative developers,” who saw endless demand; “greedy 
securitizers,” who built a financial house of cards using over-leveraged derivative insurance contracts; 
“clueless speculators,” who thought the market values of real estate could only increase; or “hapless 
regulators,” who were under-funded and held in thrall to the industries they oversaw – the bottom line is 
that there is plenty of blame to go around. As a result of this market failure, primary and secondary 
market liquidity has slowed to a trickle, significantly reducing institutional and consumer credit for the 
first time since the late 1940s. 
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The impact of  the  market failure that has  befallen  the residential real estate market during the past two years is well-known and self-evident,  even  if  the  underlying causes  and remedies remain in controversy.  Whether the market failure was caused 
by “predatory lenders,” whose only interest was in “churning product” to generate fees; 
“speculative developers,”  who saw endless demand; “greedy securitizers,” who built  a 
financial  house of cards using over-leveraged derivative insurance contracts; “clueless 
speculators,” who thought the market values of real estate could only increase;  or “hapless 
regulators,” who were  under-funded  and  held in thrall to the industries they oversaw 
– the bottom line is that there is plenty of blame to go around.  As a result of this market 
failure, primary and secondary market liquidity has slowed to a trickle, significantly 
reducing institutional and consumer credit for the first time since the late 1940s. 
Recent additional regulatory restraints have had a significant negative impact upon 
the developers of high-density condominiums and their construction lenders.  The U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) serves as the chief regulator 
of the largest single component of the secondary residential debt market, including 
Government Sponsored Entities (GSEs) and the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). 
HUD has implemented various policies which, in the aggregate, were intended to limit 
the U.S. Treasury’s exposure to speculative condominium development.1  By limiting 
access to government-backed end-user financing, the imposition of these project eligibility 
requirements has severely limited the pool of potential purchasers in newly constructed 
condominium projects.  This especially is true in Florida where additional state-specific 
regulations have been imposed.2
Using the FHA requirements as an example, a new condominium project must meet the 
following onerous qualifications:  (i) at least 80% of the FHA-insured loans in a project must 
be owner-occupied as a principal or secondary residence; and, (ii) at least 50% of all of the 
units in a project, whether FHA insured or not, must be owner-occupied as a principal or 
secondary residence.3 The requirements for FHA “spot loans” (non-project-based approval) 
are even narrower.  Ultimately, such loans are expected to be phased out altogether in 
favor of a project-based registration system.4  While these restrictions, historically, have 
not been relevant to the luxury market, because product pricing far exceeds conventional 
loan limits, they are becoming increasingly relevant to struggling luxury developers and 
their lenders.  For potential end purchasers of units in large- and medium-sized luxury 
residential condominium projects, the availability of end-user GSE-backed financing cannot 
be counted upon, regardless of the amount of cash the purchaser is willing to put down. 
The result is that, by product type, luxury condominiums now make up the largest single 
class of unsold real property. 
1  Freddie Mac, 42.1 General Condominium Project Requirements, Single Family Seller/Servicer Guide, July 7, 2009; Freddie Mac, 
HVCC, Relief Finance and Condominiums, Bulletin 2009-7 (March 31, 2009); Fannie Mae, Project Eligibility Review Service and Changes 
to Condominium and Cooperative Project Policies, Announcement 08-34, December 16, 2008; see also, Dawn Watopka, Fannie, Freddie 
Guidelines Slow Down Sales in Florida, WALL STREET JOURNAL, February 18, 2009. 
2  Fannie Mae, Ann. 08-34, at 4. 
3  24 C.F.R. § 234.26 (HUD, FHA. 
4  24 C.F.R. § 206.51; see generally, U.S. Dep’t of Housing and Urban Development, Single Family Loan Production-Condominium 
Units in Non-FHA Approved Projects, Mortgagee Letter 96-41, August 1, 2006. 
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At present, the sales velocity of condominium units is measured almost exclusively 
by the primary auction market for foreclosed properties and by the participation of cash 
purchasers.  Even purchasers who are able to put significant equity into a unit face informal 
market blacklist underwriting which discriminates against “broken condominiums.” 
Saddled with un-saleable condo projects and limited end-user financing opportunities, 
developers’ construction loans nevertheless will continue to accrue interest and penalties, 
while ad valorem taxes and project maintenance costs will collectively squeeze out any 
remaining developer equity.  Considering the costs associated with currently defaulted 
sales, taxes and association operating costs, many condominium associations’ slide into 
financial calamity seems destined to accelerate.
Under many states’ laws, developers of  newly  constructed condominium projects 
customarily retain control of  the condominium  association  until a majority of the units are 
sold; and, as a trade-off for this control, the developer guarantees payment of all association 
budgeted expenses during that period of control.5 As developers fall into the current 
financial abyss, they frequently fail to adequately fund condominium association operating 
budgets, leading to cutbacks or termination of maintenance of the projects.  This leads to 
accelerated asset deterioration.  In associations where control has been turned over to end 
purchasers, the high mortgage default rates have caused a “Catch-22” spiral wherein both 
defaulting unit owners and REO lenders are failing to pay maintenance fees, resulting in 
further neglect of maintenance, failure to fund capital reserves, and radical declines in the 
market value of units—often far in excess of those caused by general market conditions. 
When a developer is still in control of an association, the minority owners and their 
lenders have few options since the developer is not going to file liens against its own 
units.  Even when an owner-controlled association goes to the trouble of foreclosing liens 
against end purchaser units, under Florida law and the law of most states, the lien is mostly 
junior to the interests of the unit’s first mortgagee.6  Meanwhile, mortgagees forestall filing 
foreclosures, even of long-overdue defaulted condominium loans, knowing that once the 
foreclosure is completed, they will become liable for ongoing taxes and condominium fees 
at sale of the unit.  
At the same time, a construction lender is faced with the choice of either: (i) carry a 
non-performing asset on its books, hoping for more advantageous accounting treatment 
from Congress; (ii) declare the developer to be in default under its construction loan, or 
mini-perm, resulting in protracted and expensive litigation including potential  lender 
liability claims; or, (iii) declare the developer to be in default and immediately take the 
keys to the project.  In the second and third instances, the lender ends up owning a large 
number of condominium units that steadily decline in value and accrue property taxes 
and condominium maintenance fees.  Further, any lender who takes title to a block of 
condominium units in one project may end up with the liabilities of a “successor developer” 
under many states’ condominium laws.7 
Left adrift by the capital markets, it is clear that developers, lenders and condominium 
associations, jointly, must find a solution.  The solution identified herein is an alternative to 
bypass the capital market constraints by using private workout settlements, which convert 
non-performing commercial assets into performing residential assets.  This proposed 
solution provides the developer and the lender an early horizon exit strategy.  This(i) avoids 
foreclosure, default conveyance, or bankruptcy; (ii) results in bringing  financial stability to 
the condominium association, thus stabilizing property values; and (iii) provides a “bridge” 
to future GSE qualification of the project and, in the long run, takes the project into the 
mainstream market.  The agreement requires all three parties to realize that an across the 
5  For example, F.S.A.§ 718.301. (Florida); O.C.G.A § 44-3-101 (Georgia). 
6  F.S. § 718.116((1)(b)(Florida); O.C.G.A. § 44-3-109(a)(2)(Georgia). 
7  F.A.C. 61B-15.007, Developer, Defined (Florida Division of Condominiums, Timeshares and Mobile Homes).
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board reduction in price points and principal balances is an absolute.  Only in this way can 
the parties stabilize the project. 
The Coupon Mortgage Structure
Customary construction loan financing documentation provides for disbursements 
throughout the construction period. Following disbursements, the loan is either converted 
to a mini-permanent loan (a “mini-perm” loan), or replaced by a permanent “takeout” loan 
pursuant to a pre-existing tri-party agreement with  specific benchmarks for participation. 
In either case, the loan documents provide for release of each unit from the mortgage lien 
as the units are sold, upon the payment of a specified release price.
The coupon mortgage structure, essentially, is a privately-negotiated workout 
settlement that would include developer, lender(s), and condominium association.  The 
construction loan is modified to break the loan into individual loans for each condominium 
unit.  Each loan is freely assumable one time only8  upon fulfillment of straightforward 
and independently ascertainable conditions precedent, or underwriting criteria, negotiated 
by the developer and lender.   From a broader perspective, the lender is converting the 
loan’s asset class from a non-performing “scratch n’ dent” construction loan to a “shiny 
new” performing residential loan.  Creating a legal division between performing and non-
performing pieces of the same loan is a preferred workout strategy by regulators, because it 
functionally parcels and minimizes risk.9  While each lender will have different requirements 
for coupon mortgage assumptions, we recommend that the underwriting conditions be as 
few and as independently verifiable as possible. 
The purchaser is, in effect, “buying” the right to assume the coupon mortgage.  She is 
avoiding the need to pay “all cash,” notwithstanding the lack of available lending options 
and, at the same time, qualifying herself as credit-worthy.  This model is premised on the 
assumption that the lender and developer will reduce principal balances across the product 
spectrum, including reductions in price for existing contracts that have not yet closed. 
Likewise, this model ultimately depends on the purchaser’s substantial down payment, 
usually at least thirty percent. 
With the coupon mortgage workout, the lender makes its own determination about the 
borrower’s credit scores, debt-to-income ratios, and other underwriting criteria that can 
allow for private secondary market acquisitions of the assumed coupon mortgages loans. 
It is another question whether the secondary market is a junk market or a prime arbitrage 
market.  Lenders should attempt to comply with FHA guidelines for mortgage insurance 
and other private insurance underwriting criteria so  coupon mortgage loans may be sold at 
a later time when the project comes into compliance with GSE guidelines.  This may occur 
through reevaluation by a GSE-designated underwriter or GSE regulatory change.
As condominium units are sold, the remaining un-assumed coupon mortgage loans 
are administered in bulk pursuant to the terms of the loan modification agreement. While 
some lenders might hesitate to place qualification/underwriting duties into the hands 
of developers, the critical difference in this situation seems to be the free assumability of 
individual coupon mortgage loans and the easy verifiability of the underwriting conditions. 
The purchaser is either making a down payment or she is not; her credit score qualifies her 
or it does not; title is taken individually or it is not.  In any event, the lender can require 
approval and supervision of origination activities, closing statements, and credit reports, 
which independently verify fulfillment of the assumption conditions.  Ultimately, the lender 
could provide qualified on-site originators to ensure compliance with state and federal 
8  Thus, the loan is similar in nature to a one-time “coupon” payment.
9  Federal Reserve Board, et. al, Joint Policy Statement on Prudent Commercial Real Estate Loan Workouts, Section D. Classification 
and Accrual Treatment of Restructured Loans with a Partial Charge-off, 9 (2009). 
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origination regulations.  However, the developer’s sales team likely would do the bulk of 
the ground work.  Since the coupon mortgage structure bypasses conventional mortgage 
products funded by the secondary market, the issue of FHA, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac 
(“GSE”) qualification should not arise, provided the lender is prepared to hold the loans 
on a long term basis or has a pre-arranged secondary market purchaser for the coupon 
mortgage loan pool. Of course, any secondary market activity would have to comply with 
applicable securities regulations.  
Upon entering into a contract for the sale of a unit, the developer provides proof 
to the lender of fulfillment of the ascertainable conditions. Upon closing of a unit sale, 
the borrower signs standardized loan documents, which constitute a modification of 
the construction loan terms applicable to the developer, and which allow for individual 
resale or securitization of the coupon mortgage loan, if desired.  The coupon mortgage 
loan documents also provide for the usual advance escrow deposits for annual property 
taxes and, in a departure designed to stabilize the project itself, an advance escrow for 
condominium maintenance fees.  While these are not customary provisions, they  allow 
the condominium association to return to financial stability and ensure that the project is 
properly maintained and saleable and the collateral preserved for developer and lender. 
The advantages for the three parties involved are clear. The developer can sell units 
without the need for traditional residential mortgage lenders, and reduces the likelihood of 
a developer default and loss of the project.  As with traditional loans, once sales recommence 
and the outstanding principal balance of the construction loan is paid, the developer even 
stands a chance of making a profit on the project.  The lender gets to move the loan from 
delinquent status to current status on its books, eliminating the need for additional capital 
reserves.  At the same time, this effects a significant principal reduction on the outstanding 
defaulted loan, and, over time, spreads the loan risk from one huge borrower to many 
smaller borrowers.  The condominium association avoids the financial ruin that occurs 
when a developer stops funding a project and a lender refuses to pay maintenance fees. 
This process secures stable or increasing property values for all parties involved. 
If the GSE rules are relaxed in the future  or  if sales in the project later qualify the 
project for GSE project eligibility, the coupon mortgage loan documents should already be 
expected to conform to the GSE documentation criteria, which likely will allow the lender 
to phase out the coupon mortgage structure as prime market funds become available. 
The variations in cash flow which result from the conversion of the construction loan into 
multiple residential mortgage loans also could be hedged within asset liability swaps (ALS) 
market, to permit compliance with asset liability management protocols.  The reductions 
of loan principal associated with the sale of condominium units also should provide a 
significant present-value boost to the lender’s balance sheet as funds can be invested and 
re-lent outside the context of the troubled project.  Historic statistical data demonstrate 
that borrowers who invest sizeable down payments, as would be applicable here, have 
significantly lower default rates than borrowers with little or no actual investment in the 
property.10  
Additional Settlement Considerations
In negotiating the workout settlement which will result in the implementation 
of the coupon mortgage structure, developers and lenders address fundamental 
background considerations.  While these background considerations will not directly 
affect potential purchasers of condominium units, they will determine whether the 
workout settlement ultimately will succeed or fail. These workout issues include: 
10  Kelly Austin, ‘Skin in the Game’: Zero Down Payment Mortgage Default, 19 JOURNAL OF HOUSING RESEARCH 2, 75 
(2008). 
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1. To what extent the sales prices for the unsold units are to be adjusted to 
take current market conditions into account; and, if adjusted, how will 
the difference be allocated between the developer and the lender.  If the 
lender agrees to take an up-front principal reduction, some arrangement 
similar to “shared appreciation” may allow the lender partially to recoup 
such a concession.  The lender’s decision ultimately may depend upon the 
number of unclosed presales which remain in place as of the time of the 
coupon mortgage workout settlement.
2. Where the lender is the lead lender in a participation which requires 
participant approval, the lender will be responsible for compliance with 
the terms of its participation agreement and, if required by the participation 
agreement, obtaining the approval of the coupon mortgage workout 
settlement with its participant lenders.  The same would be true for special 
services, at least in terms of managing the decision process during the 
workout. 
3. Whether the lender agrees to allow interim distributions of some portion 
of each unit’s sales proceeds to the developer as an incentive to drive sales 
efforts.  This would be especially relevant where an outside sales agent is 
being used.
4. In condominium projects where developer warranties and guaranties have 
not expired, contract safeguards should be implemented to prevent the 
possibility of developer liabilities being imposed on the lender.
5. Determination of what loan and closing fees may be charged to end 
purchasers in connection with assumption of each coupon mortgage loan 
and by whom.
6. Whether there will be deadlines for the sale of particular numbers of units, 
and what happens if those deadlines are not met.  As with all workout 
settlements, special attention must be given to ensure that the lender is not 
viewed as a joint-venture partner of the developer. 
7. Whether the lender will subordinate the mortgage lien to the lien 
for unpaid condominium maintenance fees. If the coupon mortgage 
documentation includes an escrow for payment of these fees, this issue 
would not arise.  If no such escrow is provided, the lender should 
recognize that the financial stability of the condominium association 
is an essential aspect of the continued viability of all of its collateral. 
Voluntary conformance with GSE underwriting criteria also increases the probable 
salability of the coupon mortgage loans in the private mortgage market.  If the lender does 
not contemplate any future sales to GSEs, it may wish to decrease the length of the coupon 
mortgage loan’s maturity dates, notwithstanding current public demand for the stability 
of the long fixed rate product.  Ultimately, however, the lender will be able to structure the 
coupon mortgage loans according to market demand and without regard to the restrictive 
underwriting standards in the GSE market. 
At some point in time, the sales velocity at the project may be expected to fulfill the 
GSE project eligibility requirements, allowing for qualification of the project. The workout 
settlement should stipulate that the developer will qualify the project at the earliest 
opportunity.  This would allow for lower-end unit purchasers to finance a larger portion 
of their equity, speeding the time when the need for coupon mortgage loans requiring a 
greater down payment would be eliminated.
As market prices continue to drop, luxury units will begin to fall within conventional 
loan limits and will no longer require “jumbo” loans. .  An irony is that most high-end 
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luxury towers were forced by planning boards to include smaller more “affordable” units 
as a condition of project approval.  Now, it is precisely these affordable units which may be 
the key to these projects’ survival.  Projects which have achieved some sort of GSE project 
approval have benefited from a greater velocity of sales.  The coupon mortgage strategy 
offers the following valuable benefit.  As sales in the project increase due to coupon mortgage 
sales, a new round of comparable sales data and appraisals reflect increased occupancy 
and stable pricing.  This makes the project more attractive to GSEs and conventional 
mortgage lenders.  Eventually, even existing GSE thresholds may be met.  As previously 
mentioned, there is a current policy against qualifying large condominium projects which 
the government views, apparently per se, as speculative. However, frequently, there are 
exceptions to the rules.  HUD, in particular, has been very open to innovative concepts. 
Depending upon the ownership structure of particular construction loans and the 
authority given to services and trustees, one particular accounting issue should be 
addressed.  Special or master services may be required to map out a transaction blueprint 
for converting the existing construction loan from a commercial to a residential asset class. 
At present, there is some ambiguity among banking regulators for greater capital allocations 
to housing debt.  Presumably, a restructuring of a defaulted construction loan, pursuant to 
a settlement workout, would be treated more favorably than a de novo residential project 
application.  This is premised on the concept that a pool of one hundred residential loans 
with a twenty percent default rate is more attractive in present value terms than a non-
performing construction loan.  In recent public and private statements, the Treasury has 
committed to making residential financing more available to the public, despite halting their 
purchasing of residential mortgage debt.  Successful implementation of a coupon mortgage 
restructuring could result in qualification of a project for participation in a government-
supported debt relief program.
Summary
Developers, lenders and condominium associations all suffer from the shortage of 
secondary mortgage funding for condominium unit purchasers, especially in the luxury 
market.  As long as a significant principal reduction on the outstanding balance occurs with 
the closing of each coupon mortgage, each closing moves the lender and the developer into 
an increasingly better position.  The damage to a lender’s balance sheet from any individual 
unit’s default is much more easily contained than a default on the whole construction loan. 
“Loans to one borrower” limits also progressively improve as coupon mortgage loans are 
closed.  Implementation of the coupon mortgage workout settlement allows developers to 
resume sales of their inventory, lenders to recognize significant principal reductions and 
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